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As part of this forum on “Society,
Organizations and the Brain,” Butler
(2014) contributed an article on how to
operationalize interdisciplinary research
by way of introducing “a model of co-
production in organizational cognitive
neuroscience (OCN)” (p. 1).
While I appreciate his work as an
extension of prior research, there are
some misleading claims in his article in
terms of associating my previous work
with what he terms “science ideology” (a
term he does not define), and a mislead-
ing representation of key arguments pre-
sented in that body of work (Lindebaum,
2013b). Consequently, my aim in this arti-
cle is twofold. First, I demonstrate that
Butler uses the term “ideology” incor-
rectly. Second, I contrast his depiction
of my work with what it actually states.
Note that, consistent with previous work
(Lindebaum, 2013a), I am explicit that
a multitude of opinions on this seem-
ingly touchy topic is likely to yield richer
insights than any one dominant view
alone. However, I highlight a need for
accurate usage of terms and accurate
engagement with each others’ work, how-
ever much we might beg to differ on the
topic.
IDEOLOGY IN SCIENCE
The topic of ideology has been a con-
tested line of inquiry in management stud-
ies for some time (see e.g., Alvesson and
Willmott, 1992; Raftopoulou and Hogg,
2010). Key to Butler’s (2014) brief exege-
sis on ideology is the role of dominant
actors when knowledge becomes “ideo-
logical and biased in favor of particular
actors through a conflictural process” (p.
4). However, more elaboration is in order
on a topic as complex as ideology. To begin
with, it is important to understand what
scholars mean when they refer to ideol-
ogy. For instance, Van Dijk (1995) defines
ideology along these lines.
“Ideologies are basic frameworks of
social cognition, shared by members
of social groups, constituted by rele-
vant selections of socio-cultural values,
and organised by an ideological schema
that represents the self-definition of
a group. Besides their social function
of sustaining the interests of groups,
ideologies have the cognitive func-
tion of organizing the social represen-
tations (attitudes, knowledge) of the
group, and thus indirectly monitor
the group-related social practices and
hence also the text and talk of its
members” (p. 248).
In other words, ideologies are character-
ized as a system of values, ideas, and
beliefs that seek to legitimize extant hier-
archies and power relations and preserve
group identities. Therefore, ideology oper-
ates in the process of meaning in every-
day life by way of common-sense and
taken-for-granted assumptions that work
to legitimize existing power relations (e.g.,
Fairclough, 1992). The focus upon mean-
ing implies that ideology is viewed as an
imaginary relationship of individuals to
their real world, rather than a reflection
of the real world (Althusser, 1971). If we
take ideology and combine it with the
scientific knowledge we share, it is clear
that knowledge is never free of ideolog-
ical influences. Thus, neither the work
of advocates nor the work of skeptics of
OCN is ideologically free. That is, neither
camp can cast off its “ideological bound-
edness” (Fairclough, 1995). The prob-
lem arises if, among a set of ideologies,
some exercise a more powerful influence
than others, which then starts constrain
some lines of enquiry while privileging
others.
Having defined “ideology,” it is now
possible to examine Butler’s (2014) asso-
ciation of my previous work with “sci-
ence ideology.” He states that “within the
UK,” I am seemingly “a key voice for cri-
tique, however, [I am] perceived by col-
leagues as straying into science ideology”
(p. 4). However, does this accurately reflect
the power balance between advocates and
skeptics of OCN? In terms of numbers of
publications in flagship US management
journals, my counting reveals a score of
at least 15 to 0 in favor of advocates1,
so I cannot see that my work is part of
an existing hierarchy that dominates the
field. In this respect, I am reminded of
Gabriel’s (2010) observation that “what
gets published and what gets rejected . . .
are barely concealed exercises in power and
resistance . . . what gets published is one
of the most political processes” in today’s
academia (p. 761). Thankfully, other
thought-provocative and original journals
like the Journal of Management Inquiry or
1This score is calculated taking into account three
publications in the Journal of Management, four in
Leadership Quarterly, one in Organization Science,
one in Academy of Management Perspectives, one in
the Journal of Applied Psychology, two in Strategic
Management Journal, and three in Organizational
Behavior and Human Decision Processes. These
publications represent those I am aware of, hence
excluding any forthcoming or in press articles
that have not been cited widely yet. I admit that
there is a possibility that an article has escaped
my attention. Even so, this is unlikely to funda-
mentally change the score presented. Due to space
limitations, I cannot include the whole list here.
However, it is available upon request.
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Human Relations (Lindebaum and Zundel,
2013) have been more receptive to my
work2.
I also would like to briefly reflect on
Butler’s (2014) words to the effect that
I am “perceived by colleagues as straying
into science ideology” (p. 4). The first part
(in italics for emphasis) of that sentence
requires attention. Specifically, I wonder
whether Butler (2014) intended to make
a factual statement, or whether his com-
ment is based upon hearsay of the kind
we can read in tabloids. If it is the for-
mer, the reader would appreciate evidence
in support of his claim. If it is the latter, I
am not sure whether this statement adds
substance to his article.
MISLEADING CLAIMS
The second point I would like to raise
in response to Butler (2014) is his depic-
tion of key points I offered previously.
To explicate, consider the following first
quote from his article:
“On the one hand, Lindebaum and
Zundel (2013) rightly maintain that
without explicit consideration of,
and solutions to, the challenges of
reductionism, the possibilities to
advance leadership studies theoretically
and empirically are limited” (p. 4).
While it is gratifying to see one’s work
being cited, it is also important that this
is executed correctly in congruence with
academic conventions of citation prac-
tice. In this case, the above statement is
taken ad verbatim (starting with “main-
tain” and ending with “limited”) from
Lindebaum and Zundel (2013) and, there-
fore, must be accompanied by the page
number (i.e., p. 857). However, this is not
the case.
2If we follow Duster (2006) in his claim that
funding in the US is increasingly directed
toward “markers inside the body” as predictors
of socio-economic and health outcomes, then
this tendency suggests another leverage of the
OCN ideology and its associated power. The
term “power” is most suitable here, as Scott
(1992) defines it as having access to resources
(in this case, research funding). Indeed, President
Obama has just recently announced a US$100
million dollar brain-mapping research initia-
tive. See http://blogs.nature.com/news/2013/04/
obama-launches-ambitious-brain-map-project-
with-100-million.html, accessed 21 October 2013.
There are two more problems
with Butler’s depiction of my work
on the topic in the following
statement:
“On the other hand, it has been
argued that Lindebaum (2012) mis-
characterizes neuro-feedback processes
for the purpose of leader develop-
ment, which then leads to misin-
formed statements about its potential
ethics (Cropanzano and Becker, 2013)”
(pp. 4–5).
The first problem is the reference to
Lindebaum (2012). This study is not
devoted in any way to OCN (instead it
focuses on emotional standardizations at
work). The second point pertains to the
statement that I “mischaracterize neuro-
feedback processes” as applied to leader
development, “which then leads to mis-
informed statements about its potential
ethics.” Readers who have perused my
2013(b) article will quickly see that I have
characterized the neurofeedback process
by first defining it according to the view of
the International Society for Neurofeedback
and Research (Hammond et al., 2011). I
have also provided more characteristics of
the neurofeedback process with reference
to the Waldman et al. (2011) study (often
using direct quotes from that study).
Consequently, I cannot discern where
a mischaracterization has occurred. The
same applies to “misinformed statements
about potential ethics,” a point allegedly
made by Cropanzano and Becker (2013) in
response to my article. What Cropanzano
and Becker (2013) suggest, however, is
that they “strongly endorse [my] call for
scholars and others to pay closer attention
to . . . ethical concerns” (p. 306) when neu-
roscience is used in leadership research.
Of course, Cropanzano and Becker (2013)
also offer divergent and complementary
views on my critique, especially when they
argue that my “ethical inquiry does not
go far enough” and that “a more complete
analysis suggests that there are additional
matters that should also be considered” (p.
306). However, it is somewhat curious that
Butler takes this to imply “misinformed
statements about its potential ethics.” For
further clarification on Cropanzano and
Becker’s (2013) article, please consult
Lindebaum (2013a).
CONCLUDING THOUGHTS
Butler (2014) deserves credit for bringing
into the open the role of ideologies in the
construction of knowledge, especially on
a topic that enjoys hardly any substantive
critique, least of all in flagship USmanage-
ment journals. However, the clarification
of ideological charges against my work
reveals that the exact opposite of Butler’s
(2014) argument is the case, namely, that
advocates of OCN represent a domi-
nant ideological movement, one which,
through a system of ideas and beliefs, aims
to legitimize extant hierarchies and power
relations and preserve group identities as
indicated by the score presented earlier. It
is, therefore, important for future debates
to be based upon informed views, which
correctly and unequivocally reveal how the
meaning of a term is employed. Since
neuroscience as a theoretical and empiri-
cal toolkit is likely to further consolidate
its influences in management studies (and
how they fit with the theme of this research
forum), it is all the more imperative to
avoid terms being used to silence dis-
senting views or discredit prior work (for
instance, by discarding them as lacking rel-
evance and rigor). For a healthy unfolding
of the debate, I suggest it is also necessary
to engage more accurately with each oth-
ers’ work, for doing otherwise is likely to
unnecessarily create deeper chasms rather
than aiding to bridge them. I hope this
article serves this purpose.
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